Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Hart. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised Rainbow 5 which was delivered to you by General Brereton. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures you deem necessary. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Army Forces in the Far East, on November 27: The following message was sent to General Douglas MacArthur, the Commanding General, U. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on November 27: This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet:
Stark, on November 27 sent the following message to Admiral Thomas C. Ĭhief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. However, a number of cruiser and destroyer divisions, as well as Battleship Division 3 and base forces were expected to operate in the Mandates. The Sixteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit’s report for November 27 stated that it was impossible to confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines were in the Mandates, since the best sources indicated that all known First and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. Also, the document would not be carried in any aircraft. Raley promised him that this publication would not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. Either that day, or next, when Layton had another meeting with Raley, he furnished him with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. Layton stressed the urgent need for as wide as possible reconnaissance of the Marshalls, Truk and Ponape, with particular reference to Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajalein, Rongelap, Wotje and Maloelap. Raley and the Intelligence Section of the Hawaiian Air Force, to discuss the B-24 reconnaissance mission. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, United States Pacific Fleet, met with Colonel Edward W. Greg Bradsher, Senior Archivist at the National Archives at College Park, MD.
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